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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to unpack the reasons for the surge in popular support for the far right 
Populist Party in France, the Front National. The research is conducted according to the method-
ology that there are three main contributions to the surge, including economic factors, political 
factors and social issues. Each chapter is dedicated to exploring one of these contributions 
through the analysis of data such as political polls, economic statistics and public opinion. The 
main outcomes of the research are Marine Le Pen has been overall successful in moving the 
Front National from the fray to the mainstream of French politics, and the political situation in 
France is particularly volatile due to the economic mismanagement during the financial crisis of 
2008, so it was more susceptible to growing strength of a far right party.   
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PREFACE 
 
 In many ways my engagement with this topic has been a decade in the making. Always interested in 
French history and political science from my early teenage years, it wasn’t until undergrad that I began to 
explore the field of comparative politics. I became engrossed in the field, which I studied in coincidence with 
my historical research, the development of French nationalism since the French Revolution. Upon graduating in 
2010, I knew I wanted to pursue the topic with an even deeper investigation, which led me to widen my scope 
to Western Europe and look specifically at the phenomena of the far right political parties, something I saw as 
being contradictory to the European ideals of tolerance and openness I grew up idolizing in a society. The rise 
of these parties both disrupted and changed the discourse of European affairs, and I have spent my time at 
DePaul researching this shift. My thesis provided me with the opportunity to deeply look at France from an 
economic, political and social perspective, but also gave me the chance to utilize my interest in comparative 
politics, by including a comparison with four other European countries, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Sweden and Greece.  
 The following thesis is the accumulation of my research thus far. The topic is increasingly dynamic with 
new events changing the conversation every day, one of the biggest challenges to covering such an ongoing 
subject, but also one of the most appealing aspects.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic, political and social landscape of the European Union is undergoing a sea change due to 
the relatively recent surge in influence of the leading extremist political parties, from the far left and the far 
right. Although their ideological roots come from very different places, what these parties share in common is 
their mutual disdain for the Eurozone; and more often than not, the European project as a whole. Lauded as a 
project for peace, many of these euro-skeptics disagree with the notion that the EU has helped prevent wars 
between European Nations for the past 70 years, and rather, has encouraged economic wars, as countries 
struggle to retain some sort of control over their own economic destinies. One of the founding members of the 
European Union, France has long fostered a kind of counter culture in the political realm, manifested in the 
forms of anti-Europe, ultra-nationalist parties. What has changed in the past several years is the seriousness of 
the threat these parties pose to the French presidency and the European Parliament. The Front National has 
been making historically unprecedented gains in the years following the financial crisis of 2008. However, the 
rise of the Front National and other populist far right parties like it across Western Europe cannot be attributed 
to economics alone. Two other factors are at play: political leadership and cultural conflict. Where all three of 
these major issues are seen, stagnant economic growth coupled with high unemployment, plus highly 
unfavorable ratings of the current president and an influx of immigration, the degrees of support for the far 
right, or similarly extreme euroskeptics, seems to be much higher. What makes the Front National unique from 
other far right populist parties in its same political family is the very real presence of the party to compete for 
the presidency in the next election, scheduled for 2017. The people of France are discouraged by their 
country’s lack of economic opportunity, especially for young people, and many citizens blame Brussels, home 
of the E.U. for their troubles. 
There is a certain momentum behind the Front National, and their groundbreaking performance in the 
2014 European Parliament election no doubt only reinforced what is often left unsaid: the Front 
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National are no longer a mere ‘outsider’ party and have broken into the mainstream of French politics. This 
considered, the Front National have a real chance at taking control of the country’s highest office come 2017, 
especially if the economic situation and threats of terrorism continue. That being said, this thesis aims to 
answer the following questions: 
1. What kinds of economic, political and social mechanisms did Marine Le Pen use to bring the Front 
National into mainstream French politics, and has she succeeded?  
2.How exactly does far-right ideology gain acceptance in a historically 'liberal' society? 
3.  How do the positions of the Front National differ from the societal norms of French society, and 
how do they draw on tradition to push their message?  
Having looked at this all, I will finally ask if the Front National can really be considered a 'far right' party, when 
their economic platform is not entrenched in a classically populist agenda. The last question is imperative 
because understanding the specific policies of parties on an individual basis, rather than as a general ideology 
based on party family structures allows us to uncover why certain messages are registering with voters, and 
additionally serves as a strategy for successful counter-campaigns. The last question will also bring the research 
back full circle and allow for an expansive interrogation of the main question, has Le Pen been successful at 
bringing the Front National into mainstream politics?   
 My hypothesis is: the surge of the Front National’s public support is due to France’s deteriorating 
economic, social and political situations as a result of its membership within the Eurozone and also as a result 
of the countries mismanagement by the government.  
 I plan to support this hypothesis by analyzing the Front National’s economic policy, in addition to 
analyzing the Front National’s social and political policies, especially concentrating on nationalism, immigration 
and relations with the EU. This precise and differentiated appeal has thus led to the Front National to more 
success than if they had only policies strictly appealing to the traditional right. 
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Outline of Major Euroskeptic Parties and Hypothesis 
 
  It must be emphasized that this phenomenon of far right electoral surge is not unique to France, but 
rather, is something sweeping the EU as a whole. In order to firmly situate France as a case study in the larger 
field of extreme political parties, I am going to provide a concise analysis of several significant parties from 
across Europe.  Those same countries will be revisited later in the project to compare economic and political 
statistics with. The parties I will cover include: United Kingdom Independence Party in Great Britain (UKIP), 
Sweden Democrats in Sweden (SD), Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV) and Syriza in Greece. With the 
exception of Syriza, all of these parties are politically populist far-right. However, with its message of breaking 
free from the Eurozone and ending relations with Brussels, Syriza shares much in common with the far right, 
even though it is technically a far left party. This also goes to show how in Europe, both the far left and the far 
right have similar motivations when it comes to relations with the European Union. These parties have been 
selected for various, specific reasons. UKIP was selected for comparison because they share many of the same 
ideals and controversies as Front National, however, the two parties are often at odds and UKIP does not want 
to be formally associated with FN, despite their overwhelming similarities. Sweden Democrats were selected 
because they have enjoyed a similar spike in popularity in a country with an enormous immigrant population, 
much like France. An interesting dynamic exist in Sweden, in that, while their government supports an “open 
arms” approach to immigration, a sizeable portion of their population are turning to the Sweden Democrats to 
push the ultra-nationalist agenda and put a halt to the number of incoming immigrants. PVV is the most overtly 
similar party to Front National, and their leader, Geert Wilders, like the Le Pen’s, is similarly outspoken and 
controversial. PVV and FN represent countries that are both culturally and politically similar. Syriza is being 
included because no discussion of changing European politics in 2015 and beyond is complete without 
mentioning how this far-left, anti-Europe party won the Greek Presidency. After years of austerity, with public 
unrest and rioting at an all-time high, Greece electing Syriza serves as an example of the worst possible 
outcome of all of the economic and political drama confronting the European Project. Of course, these four 
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aforementioned parties are not the only groups representative of the current political backlash in Europe.  
 The United Kingdom Independence Party was founded in 1991 by Dr. Alan Sked (Ford and Goodwin 
2014).  More of an academic than a politician, Sked’s main concerns were with theory and abstract ideas, 
rather than concrete strategy for expanding party awareness (Ford and Goodwin 2014).  Although the core of 
UKIP’s message resonated well with working class voters, Sked was seen as largely disconnected from the blue-
collar crowed that felt left behind by the labour party. UKIP’s largest region of support were in the south of 
England originally, although today they have a much wider sphere of influence across the whole of the UK. One 
major turning point in UKIP’s support was hiring Dick Morris, a senior advisor to Bill Clinton’s presidential 
campaign (Ford and Goodwin 2014).  Morris helped simplify UKIP’s message into a simple “Say No” campaign, 
which portrayed the party’s position on issues ranging from European integration to immigration (Ford 2014).  
Another turning point in UKIP’s rise to prominence was in the mid-2000’s, when UKIP leaders actively tried to 
differentiate themselves from Britain’s other far-right party, British National Party (BNP). UKIP announced that 
any supporters who would offer concessions to BNP should simply leave the party, a demonstration of 
leadership which made clear the differences between UKIP and the more extreme, more racist BNP (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014).  Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, UKIP has been taken more 
seriously and placed themselves as a major contender for forming a coalition government in the upcoming 
elections (set for 7 May 2015). A few factors have contributed to the recent surge in UKIP support, including 
the declining British economy, leaving many uneducated, blue-collar workers behind. Related to that point, the 
influx of immigrants and new labour weak immigration policy has seen many jobs previously held by Brits go to 
immigrants who will work for lower wages. In addition to traditionally labour voters feeling left behind, 
disenchanted conservatives form a significant portion of UKIP constitutes. Some challenges faced by UKIP if 
they want to continue to widen their appeal are increasing their support of younger voters, women, and ethnic 
minorities. 
 As of January 2015, with the next general election only five months away, UKIP was the third most 
supported party in Britain, below Labour and Conservative. Their leader, Nigel Farage, is campaigning as an 
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equal to the major parties, rather than as an outsider. The inclusion of UKIP in the election debate shows that 
major media outlets are starting to take the party, and their voters’ concerns, more seriously.  However, after 
the May 2015 general election, with UKIP failing to win more than one seat in parliament, despite strong 
pockets of support, Farage announced he would step down as party leader. The future for UKIP’s political 
prowess at present time is uncertain, 
 Rooted in Neo-Nazism, the Sweden Democrats have historically been classified as a marginal party. As 
a party, they were formed in the late eighties and consisted of right-wing extremist and former criminals up 
until the party was re-organized in the early 2000’s (Art 2011). It is only in recent years that they have gained 
national attention and been taken more seriously, less as a marginalized group of neo-Nazis and more so a 
viable alternative party. The rise of the Sweden Democrats, the economic crisis, and an open arms approach to 
immigration are all contributing factors to the changing of Swedish political discourse. Up until 2010, they had 
never previously won enough votes to be elected to Parliament (Art 2011).  The general election of 2010 
changed that narrative. Just two years after the financial crisis of 2008, and in the midst of an economic 
recession, the Sweden Democrats were able to successfully, though controversially, convince the public that 
they deserved a vote. The young leader of the party, Jimmie Akesson, is just 36 years old, but he campaigned 
with the tenacity of a veteran politician. For example, in one of their campaign commercials, the Sweden 
Democrats advertised an elderly white woman in line for pension benefits being trampled by a hoard of 
Muslim women in burqas running toward the line for welfare payments (Castle 2010). A major news station in 
Sweden refused to air this ad, but eventually agreed to air it with parts censored. The dispute over the ad 
allowed the Sweden Democrats to claim they were “victims of censorship” and garnered them a great deal of 
publicity (Castle 2010). The majority of the public is quick to dismiss the Sweden Democrats, as can be seen in 
the violence towards party members, the employment rates of party members, and a measure in Swedish 
media to mention the word “xenophobic” anytime the Sweden Democrats are mentioned (Art 2011). 
 The fact that the Sweden Democrats were able to win 5.7% of the general vote, however, points to a 
growing minority of Swedes who identify with their radical rhetoric (Economist 2010). The 5.7% was enough to 
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win 20 seats in Parliament, granting the Sweden Democrats the power of influence from the inside. Two 
factors contributed to the Sweden Democrats winning an unprecedented amount of votes in the 2010 election: 
economic consequences and an influx of immigration. Generally, when compared to the struggling peripheral 
nations of Europe, Sweden survived the economic crisis satisfactorily. Compared with other Nordic countries, 
however, Sweden has not fared so well, as Swedes found they were not immune to the negative implications 
of the 2008 Economic crisis. For example, Sweden’s GDP growth went from positive, 3.4% in 2007, to negative -
5.3 in 2009. (EIU Data Tool) Public debt grew almost 4%, and unemployment rose, going from 6.2 in 2008 to 8.3 
in 2009 (EIU Data Tool). The economic consequences of the financial crisis help to demonstrate the conditions 
in the labour market in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats are adamantly anti-immigration, claiming they want to 
“cut immigration by 90 percent” and think “the growth of Sweden’s Muslim population is the country’s biggest 
foreign threat since World War II” (Castle 2010). Akesson consistently makes headlines for his nationalistic 
platform, attracting plenty of attention to his party and their beliefs. Akesson speaks against multiculturalism 
and emphasizes the need for those migrating to Sweden to become more Swedish. Akesson says, “European 
countries have to get rid of this naïve idea of multiculturalism as a melting pot. People who come to Sweden 
must become as Swedish as possible. They are the ones who have to adjust, not us” (The Economist 2011) 
 In the Netherlands, the political response to immigration intervention has only increased in the past 
few decades. Two of the most notable parties to emerge with a strong anti-immigration sentiment are the LPF 
and PVV parties. The first of these parties is LPF, or List Pim Fortuyn, named after its leader, Pim Fortuyn, a 
sociology professor from Rotterdam. Fortuyn openly rejected multiculturalism and was vocally and adamantly 
against Islam (Economist 2002).  He called for an end of immigration and was very much the face of the far-
right movement in the Netherlands. The LPF was formed in 2001, just in time for the 2002 parliamentary 
elections. Just weeks before the election, however, Fortuyn was assassinated. Fortuyn’s assassination marked 
the first political murder in the Netherlands since the 17th century, and furthermore, tied the ideas of extreme 
right politics to violent intervention (Economist 2002). Following his assassination, the government called for 
campaigning to freeze until the election took place. In the 2002 election, the LPF party gained enough votes to 
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become the second largest party in the Netherlands. It must be mentioned that although the LPF won a 
sizeable victory in May, following the election their public opinion poll results drastically dropped (Art 2011). 
This decrease in popular support is said to be caused by lack of leadership, without Fortuyn as the face of the 
party, the internal factions began to compromise the party’s legitimacy. However, for a previously unknown 
party, running on a campaign promise of an end to immigration, this victory was majorly representative of the 
changing political climate in the early 21st century. LPF was not a sustainable political party, but their message 
and influence paved the way for the next wave of Dutch far-right politicians. PVV, or the Dutch Party for 
Freedom, is among the most openly discriminatory of the radical right in modern Europe. The Party for 
Freedom was founded in 2005, however, it is only in the years following the recession that the party has gained 
significant support and is now among the largest parties in the Netherlands. Led by Geert Wilders, Party for 
Freedom has become known as the anti-immigrant party, and their leader is constantly making headlines for 
his extreme rhetoric. For example, Wilders gave a speech addressing the problem of immigration in the 
Netherlands. Wilders asked the crowed if they would like to see more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands. 
The vivacious crowed chanted back to him “fewer, fewer!” Wilders responded by saying “then we will arrange 
that!” (Guardian 2014). The crowd laughed back in reply, as if the dismissal of one of The Netherlands largest 
minority groups was a joke. Many Dutch born, ethnically Moroccan’s reacted in anger to this and vowed to 
pursue Wilders in court on account of hate speech (Guardian 2014). Wilders insists that he is not trying to 
spread a message of hate, but his comments may indicate otherwise. He has stated “I believe the Islamic 
ideology is a retarded, dangerous one, but I make a distinction…I don’t hate people, I don’t hate Muslims” (Art 
2011). PVV has firm positions against Islam: the official party stance is to outlaw the Koran, the Islamic holy 
book. Additionally, they support taxes on women’s headscarves and want to ban the headscarf in any public 
space, a law that has recently passed in the Netherlands to the surprise of many more liberal voters. Wilders 
himself has lived “under constant police protection since 2004,” and has been threatened multiple times by 
Muslims fed up with his message (Art 2011). 
 PVV is not only supported for its anti-immigration and anti-Muslim stance, it is also anti E.U., and has 
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attracted Eurosceptic voters across the country. The party calls for an end to the Euro and has made comments 
about “slaying the monster in Brussels” (The Economist 2013). 2010 marked a decisive year for the PVV’s 
popularity, most likely due to the declining economic situation in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis; the party 
won an unprecedented 24 seats in Dutch Parliament, making them the third largest party in the Netherlands. 
The PVV’s popularity may have peaked, however, if the results from the 2014 European Parliament election are 
any indication. The PVV was expected to attract a massive amount of support; however, it actually lost votes, 
decreasing from five to three seats in the European Parliament (Hakhverdian 2014). Wilders blames this loss to 
low overall voter turnout, rather than a sign that voters are moving towards a more pro-immigration, pro-
Europe mentality. The anti-immigration sentiments mentioned in the form of radical right parties are not 
isolated instances of discrimination. For example, one of the most extreme legislative measures pushed by the 
Dutch government in recent years is the “end of dual citizenship” (Keij 2012). The bill made headway in 2012, 
and was extraordinarily close to being passed, making it almost all the way without being noticed. The 
objective of this bill was complex, on the surface; it seemed to be a legislative measure to ensure Dutch 
allegiance, as it called for anyone with Dutch citizenship to denounce all other citizenships (Keij 2012). On the 
other hand, this bill was targeted towards the large population of Moroccans living in the Netherlands. 
According to Moroccan law, a Moroccan national cannot legally renounce their citizenship (Keij 2012). This bill, 
had it been passed, would have forced Moroccan’s to denounce their Dutch citizenship, making it a targeted 
derogatory effort. Of course, had the bill passed, it would have largely only held symbolic consequences, but 
they are representative of the growing trend of fears in immigration across the Netherlands. 
 Created as an alliance of leftist parties, Syriza was officially born in 2004, and serves to represent both 
the classic left and various social movements of the 20th century (BBC 2015). Although still a new party, Syirza 
has capitalized on various elements such as historical communist support and Greece’s financial catastrophe to 
gain prominence. In addition, Syriza has appealed to Greek youths, the jobless, the middle and lower classes 
through their anti-elitist messages. Integral to Syriza’s wide appeal is their leader, forty year old Alexis Tsipras. 
Tsipras is the youngest leader of modern Greece. Tsipras has managed to remain unencumbered by rigid 
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ideology and maintains Syriza as a diverse party with a strong internal democracy (BBC 2015). After winning the 
January 2015 elections, Syriza has been trying to renegotiate its bailout from the EU through talks that left 
many wondering about Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. Mr. Tsipras has used the aforementioned possibility as 
an instrument to obtain extension on the deadlines established for the payments of the loans. Additionally, 
they are also fiercely anti-austerity, something that all of these parties share in common.  
  These parties which I have briefly discussed are all significant to the larger theme of extreme 
parties in Western Europe, but they differ from each other as well. They are fit for comparison with the Front 
National because while all of them have areas of contrast, they overlap in their relationship with the E.U. The 
parties I have mentioned have been carefully selected because of their current relevance and strength, and 
their diverse representation and my prior familiarity with them. The Netherlands is most similar to France in 
that both are integral members of the Eurozone and are historically pro-Europe nations. Although they 
certainly weathered the economic crisis better than France, Geert Wilders and the PVV is one of the most vocal 
representations of far right sentiment seen in Europe.  Sweden is a wealthy country outside of the Eurozone 
which has a defined problem of racial relations largely due to their generous asylum policy, and the reactions 
against such are personified in the Sweden Democrats. The United Kingdom is again, outside of the Eurozone, 
but has strong ties to Europe and a sizeable portion of UK citizens are in favor of joining the Eurozone, those 
who are adamantly against closer ties to Europe are manifested in the UKIP party.  Finally, although on the 
opposite end of the political spectrum, the far left in Greece, Syriza and their dynamic leader Alexis Tsipras 
have won the presidency on the promise to break off relations with the Eurozone all together, a shocking and 
unprecedented step which has the ability to affect the future of Europe as we know it.   
 As I have demonstrated, the Front National is but one of many parties within Europe sharing 
overlapping anti-Europe sentiments. Through this project, I aim to understand what mechanisms can be 
highlighted as a means to political gain, not only in the European Union’s largest country, France, but also 
throughout Western Europe as a sort of observable pattern. This project does not aim to be a history of the 
Front National, rather, an examination of their political strategy and an analysis of the circumstances they have 
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capitalized on to get to where they are today. Through careful investigation, this project should serve as a 
means for evaluating the trajectory of support for similar political parties, whether they be considered “far 
right” or “far left.” 
 In the following chapter, the literature review covers relevant works spanning political theory, current 
affairs and major debates. The works included are a mix of academic books and journals and modern media, 
including magazine and newspaper articles, to get a ‘real time’ sense of the situation in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The overarching goal of this literature review is to develop an understanding of exactly what the far 
right is, and differentiate the “far right” from the “radical right.” By deconstructing that question into smaller 
pieces, I am able to see what constitutes the field of populist politics and the underlying theory that supports it. 
Of particular importance to this research is fully comprehending why far right parties are more politically and 
electorally successfully in some European states, but not in others. 
This literature review is organized both chronologically and thematically, with noticeable areas of 
overlap used to bridge each author’s contribution to the field. The themes I have chosen to focus on are 
“radical right theory,” which is general and concerned with the ideology behind the radical right. This section 
includes leading arguments for why voters vote radical right, why this ideology is appealing, and how this 
political family came about. The next theme is “Front National,” and these pieces are specifically focused on 
France and the Front National. This section takes themes from the first section and puts them to practical use 
through analysis of the situation in France, specifically. The third section is the “theory,” and contains leading 
theories used to explain the rise of the far right and its ideological origins. These theories are ones in which I 
will employ in my larger argument later on in the project. 
These recurring themes, presented as the major debates in the field, all attempt to unpack the reasons 
why the far right has been successful, and furthermore, understand what political implications this appeal can 
have on mainstream parties. While this literature review does include some older, “cornerstone” pieces, the 
majority of the works more modern in publication, due to the dynamic and ever changing nature of politics. 
The earliest text I will address in this literature review is Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan’s 1967 
“Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” from Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Lipset & Stein’s contribution is a foundational argument for what 
constitutes as “cleavages” in modern politics. The authors argue that cleavages exists in two ways: territorial, 
concerned with defining the nation, stemmed from the French Revolution; and functional, or interest-based, 
stemmed from the Industrial Revolution. Lipset and Stein demonstrate the four criteria for which political 
cleavages are translated into party differences: legitimation, incorporation, representation and majority power. 
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Lipset and Stein’s work is a cornerstone piece in how we understand cleavages, and therefore how we 
understand fringe parties and the far right; their work has left the door open for more thorough investigations 
on the effects of these cleavages in modern politics. 
Kriesi et. al expands on the theoretical ideas presented in Lipset & Rokkan in that they translate the 
theory to a modern application, in their West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. This text argues that 
globalization has created a set of “winners” and “losers,” and the effects of these sets are articulated in the 
forms of political parties. Economic competition, increasing cultural diversity and political competition all 
contribute to the determining of the “winners” and the “losers” of globalization. According to Kriesi et. al, 
losers of globalization include those whose lives were traditionally protected by national boundaries, and are 
thereby experiencing a threat, real or perceived, to their social status and security. This definition eludes to how 
various cleavage parties across Europe situate themselves in this larger debate and begins to shed some light 
on why these parties are appealing to particular kinds of people, in addition to questioning whether or not this 
represents a new cleavage, and if so, what kind of cleavage has it created? 
Cas Mudde’s The Ideology of the Extreme Right dives into a topic he explains has not been explored 
enough: deconstructing exactly what is “the extreme right.” Mudde explains the problematic nature of grouping 
political parties into families based on similar ideology, as deeper investigation reveals that these “families” 
may not be so similar, after all. The author also acknowledges that many terms commonplace in the discipline 
have no agreed on definition, although the term in and of itself is widely used, for example “right-wing 
extremism.” Mudde finds that there are five characterizes which are mostly agreed upon to define what is 
“right-wing extremism” and notes they are: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong 
state. Mudde’s case studies are Germany, Flanders and the Netherlands, and by contrasting their respective 
“extreme right” parties, he is able to highlight the foundational differences in their ideologies, despite all of the 
parties mentioned falling under the same party family. Mudde ultimately argues that political parties should be 
evaluated on an individual basis rather than as a part of an imagined ideological whole. 
Hanz-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall’s The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and 
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Movement in Established Democracies contains contributions about extreme right parties across the globe, 
from France to India to New Zealand. This international collection makes their work unique and offers a chance 
to compare conditions surrounding the rise of the far right across developed countries. Betz and Immerfall 
argue that insecurity and physiological strain associated with large-scale uncertainty, such as increasing 
structural and socioeconomic changes, are the reason populist right parties are expiring success worldwide. 
Betz and Immerfall highlight a similarity that these parties share, in that the most successful radical right 
populist parties have strong, charismatic leaders coupled with tight knit internal organization, which 
contributes to the ability to make decisions regarding policy quicker than other parties. By placing equal 
importance on party organization and party leadership, Betz and Immerfall situate themselves in the middle of 
the debate on what makes neo-populist parties successful in certain countries. 
        Simon Bornschier’s Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western 
Europe argues very specifically that far right parties in Europe are almost entirely a cultural reaction (question 
of identity), rather than an economic reaction. In this argument, Bornschier offers a dramatic departure than 
what was discussed in Kriesi et. al, as Bornschier says economics play no role in the mobilization of the populist 
right. One of the central arguments in the text states that the rise of the populist right is a consequence of the 
growing presence of new cultural dimensions of conflict at the expense of the economic state-market cleavage. 
Bornschier focuses on how the populist right gained momentum by framing the question of identity and 
community in terms of “us” vs “the other,” and offers immigration and the inability to integrate as examples of 
this. Another major contribution of Bornschier’s text is the argument that the core of the populist right’s 
ideology consists of opposition to the process of societal modernization. Because of this, Bornschier argues that 
right wing populist right parties should be seen in a context of changing societal structures, which relates back 
to his initial cultural vs economic argument. 
Douglas Holmes’ Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism outlines political events 
of the 1980’s and 1990’s through an integralist framework, which Holmes describes as being a vigorous 
engagement with the modern world, which stemmed from a commitment to traditional cultural forms. Holmes’ 
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work is concerned with how integralism has been translated into politics via a “cadre of committed partisans,” 
in particular Jean Marie Le Pen. These partisan leaders have “shrewdly discerned ruptures in the experience of 
belonging that threatened various registers of European identity. Integralism, according to Homes, adheres to 
an extremely contentious theory of society, one marked by anti-materialism and authoritarian socialism, in 
order to deter the advances of fast-capitalism and multiculturalism. 
Lloyd Kramer’s Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures and Identities since 1775 offers a 
comprehensive, theoretical history of nationalism vis a via a comparison of various European countries and the 
United States. Kramer offers various definitions and arguments for what constitutes nationalism as well has the 
origins of nationalism in the modern world. By looking at a varied field of subjects, including culture, politics, 
religion, wars, language, race, etc., Kramer gives scope to the various areas of the world in which nationalism 
influences. In his post war chapter, Kramer draws a comparison between France and the United States, noting 
how because of their similar histories of revolutionary origins and collective support for national ideals and 
universality, France and the United States are two of the most nationalist countries in the modern world.  This 
comparison is something I have not read in other books on the subject, but I agree with Kramer’s position on 
the matter. Kramer further discusses France as it relates to the European Union, noting that President De Gaulle 
was nationalist but still saw that the benefits of joining the European Economic Commission would far outweigh 
the drawbacks. In this case, Kramer notes that peace and transnational cooperation were driving factors to raise 
public and political support for further EU integration.  
David Art’s Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe is 
mostly concerned with answering the question of why anti-immigrant, far-right parties seem to succeed in 
some countries, while failing in others. In particular, he compares the UK, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Sweden 
with Italy, France and the Netherlands to understand the different political systems that allow far-right parties 
to rise in the latter countries. Art argues that the rise of these parties is more so due to the ability of their 
leaders, who are often charismatic, educated and seemingly rational, rather than a variety of outside factors, 
such as immigration levels and economics. Of course, much has changed since Inside the Radical Right was 
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published, in particular, the countries he selected as not having major far right parties now to some degree all 
of seen increased momentum in popularity of these parties. In the UK and Sweden in particular, you do see the 
leadership capability of both Nigel Farage of UKIP and Jimmie Akesson of Sweden Democrats. The time frame of 
the books publishing and the current status of the parties mentioned suggests that the economic slowdown has 
had much to do with the rise of the far right. Despite some of his judgments being outdated, the text still 
presents a solid base argument for the importance of a central party figurehead. Art’s placement of the party 
leader as more important that cultural or economic factors diverges from other authors I have reviewed. 
In Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, Terri Givens explores the question of why radical right 
parties win more seats in some countries than others. Givens asserts that to understand this question, a 
systematical comparison of institutional structures in each country, including party systems and the electoral 
system, must be explored. She argues that extreme right parties are not as successful in electoral systems that 
encourage strategic voting (the tendency for voters to feel they are “wasting” their vote if they vote for their 
first-choice party, so instead they vote with the party who has the best chance of beating their least-preferred 
party). Although Givens considers the socio-economic environment of voters, she does not place prominence 
on it, as many authors have done in the past. Instead, her focus is primarily institutional, which allows her to 
craft a hypothesis that can be applied in various developed countries. Givens also differs from authors such as 
David Art, as she argues that strong party leadership is only consequential in the instance of a holding a party 
together after a major faction has formed. 
While the previous works reviewed have been of a more general political nature, the next few pieces 
are specific to the case study of my project: France. One of the leading voices in French political scholarship is 
Nonna Mayer, and her article “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right” is 
particularly relevant to my project. In the article, Mayer provokes the question of how Marine Le Pen’s differs 
from her father, and explores the degree of variance that exists in the two leader’s policies. Mayer goes through 
several categories of issues that Marine Le Pen and her father might differ on, such as unemployment, 
immigration, E.U. integration, etc. but is insistent that Front National voters are very ideologically and socially 
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similar regardless of who is the party leader. Ultimately, Mayer concludes that Marine Le Pen’s ability to attract 
women better than her father has given her electoral success, which, she notes, could prove catastrophic for 
both the mainstream left and the right. 
In support of Mayer’s conclusions, Marit Ann Berntson’s Daughters of Jeanne D'Arc: Women in the 
French Front National argues that women actually play a much larger role in the Front National that is typically 
assumed. Berntson dispels the belief that female party members play second fiddle to the male party members 
through her extensive field work and interviews with women in the Front National. Berntson’s objective is to 
understand why these women join the Front National, and what larger implication their political activism has. In 
an attempted to understand what the experience of being a member of the Front National is like for these 
women, she finds that the women of Front National are concerned about issues affecting all parties, such as 
globalization, immigration, unemployment and crime. Berntson’s workplaces high importance on women’s role 
within the Front National, while at the same time investigating gender roles, nationalism and political identity. 
Taking a different approach from Mayer, James Shields is more concerned with policy formation as a 
whole, rather than analyzing the effects of different leaders on party policy. Shields’ “Radical or Not So Radical? 
Tactical Variation in Core Policy Formation by the Front National” interrogates how capable of change the Front 
National is in terms of the policy agenda it sets for itself. By tracing a single issue, immigration, Shields argues 
that Front National is actually more capable of dynamic representation in terms of policy responsiveness than it 
is typically expected to be. Usually thought of as a single-issue party, Shields traces the development of the 
Front National’s immigration policy from the 1970’s to present day and shows how the party’s immigration 
policy has changed over the years: from not being an important part of the policy, to being the “single issue,” 
and now, with the party trying to diversify its issue portfolio, one of a few main issues. Shields ultimately 
provokes an important question, that is, can we really classify the Front National as a “radical” party, given its 
history of issue adaptability? 
Similar to Shields, Gabriel Goodliffe takes a historical approach to understanding the sustaining success 
of the Front National in his The Resurgence of the Radical Right in France: From Boulangisme to the Front 
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National. Goodliffe’s traces the origins of the radical right in France from the end of the 19th century all the way 
until the 2007 presidential election. By doing this extensive historical study, Goodliffe is able to argue that there 
is another side to the debate, which usually places the Front National’s success on the coincidence of rising 
unemployment and powerful anti-immigrant stance. Goodliffe attributes the Front National’s success to an 
unusual class struggle over time, which has created sustained pockets of support for the populist right and its 
causes. Goodliffe’s main claim is that the Front National must be understood as an uninterrupted political 
tradition, rather than as a party with bursts of success here and there. 
Far right political parties such as the Front National prey upon fears of an increasingly jeopardized 
national identity as part of their campaign strategy, so for the purposes of this literature review, covering theory 
concerned with nationalism and unpacking motivations for voting radical right was crucial. Craig Calhoun’s 
Social Theory and the Politics of Identity contains contributions from leading social theorist attempting to make 
sense of the differences in the modern discourse of identity politics. The relationship between identity and 
nationalism, and where these themes fit in the larger narrative on social theory are the main subjects of 
argument. Early in the text, Calhoun argues that identity is directly related to the modern era due to efforts to 
consolidate individualism and reinforce sameness. Elsewhere in the text, Calhoun argues that nationalism is a 
contemporary construct, rather than something inherited or primordial, which allows citizens to deal with 
problems of recognition and the exclusionary nature of state powers. Although Calhoun states that nationalism 
is not intrinsically a bad thing, the way it is employed by authoritarian regimes to impose state power as a tool 
of repression is certainly problematic. 
In “Forms of Attachment to the European Union: a Study of French Conceptions of Identity in the 
Context of a Changing Europe,” Richard C. Robyn investigates the impact of a growing European power at the 
supranational level on the individual levels, focusing on France. The main theory Robyn works from is 
transnational constructivism, and argues that the European Union has helped facilitate the notion that national 
identity is no longer dominant in the European context. Because of this, Europeans are having to create new 
ways to politically identify themselves. Robyn finds through his case study that French people seem willing to 
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bypass the state on certain issues, but are not showing disfavor towards the state overall. While I do not agree 
with the conclusions made by Robyn, because post-2008 European identity seems to be of a growing cause of 
anxiety amongst the individual due to the Eurozone financial crisis; his work in transnational constructivism is 
very thorough and represents a different theoretical dimension.   
 Much of the literature in this subject has been very broad and very little of it focuses on France in 
particular. For instance, Katie Engelhart’s “The Rise of the Far Right” offers an expansive investigation of Far-
Right parties all over Europe, including France. Engelhart discusses France’s contribution to the rise of the Far-
Right by noting France’s participation in the “The Future of Nationalist movements” conference in Tokyo in 
August, 2010. Engelhart discusses the political alliance between Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. She also 
touches on Ms. Le Pen’s influence in French politics, despite not being officially elected. The example Englehart 
offers is in a 2010 television interview, Marine Le Pen “compared Muslims praying in the streets to France’s 
occupation by Germany during the Second World War A year later, France banned street prayers and became 
the first European country to prohibit face-covering niqabs in public – in an effort to appease Le Pen, many 
argue.”  Engelhart alludes to Le Pen’s ability to influence French politics in another way, as she points out 
Madame Le Pen has an eight point higher approval rating than President Hollande. Engelhart also touches on 
President Sarkozy’s willingness to act on issues raised by Le Pen in an effort to “claw back rightist voters from 
Le Pen.”   Where Englehart touches on issues regarding the political situation in France, it is still merely an 
overview, as her piece is a very general look at the climate in Europe as a whole. What’s more, she does not 
touch on the economic situation in France. This is where the author and Englehart differ. The author will go in 
depth to political and economic issues facing France, and offer a through look at France, specifically.  
 Jacobs et. Al’s “European Parliament Elections in Times of Crisis” is a multi-faceted report about the 
current conditions facing voters of the 2014 European Parliament elections. The authors describe the political 
climate and breakdown why 2014 is an important year for European elections. The authors address the 
criticism that low-turnout renders the EP elections insignificant by offering a comparison to U.S. Congressional, 
Mid-Term elections. They say “it should also be noted that turnout for the US Congressional elections, arguably 
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to elect the most powerful parliament of all, is also very low; indeed, turnout for mid-term elections is 
consistently lower than for the EP elections. And yet this argument is not traditionally used to question 
Congress’s legitimacy. “This piece offers an in-depth political investigation of the EP’s composition, providing 
graphs which map the current EP composition and compare it with the estimated post-election composition of 
the EP. The report also discusses the ruse of Euroscepticism and notes “the financial and economic crisis in 
Europe is generally assumed to have fuelled Eurosceptic sentiments, and the EP elections are seen to provide 
an excellent forum for voters to express their discontent not only with the process of European integration, but 
with the political establishment more generally.”  This 29 page report is very in-depth, providing the reader 
with an up close look at the fundamentals of the EP and the election process. However, it only lightly touches 
on France, and focuses heavily on politics and not so much on economics. My research will differ in that I will 
present the issues in France, and analyze political and economic factors equally.  
 The next piece I will review is from The Economist’s “Special Report: France,” and were integral to the 
discourse on France’s economic crisis.  I was very much inspired by both pieces. The Economist’s “The Time-
Bomb at the Heart of Europe” is especially notable, as its controversial subject matter has angered French 
Politian’s. The image used for this issue of the Economist was several baguettes tied together with the French 
flag like dynamite, with a lit fuse burning at the end. The article explains why France’s unique position as one of 
the proprietors of the Euro makes its vulnerability in lieu of the economic crisis particularly ironic. The article 
discusses that being part of the Eurozone has worked counterintuitively for France, making it impossible for 
France to have the option of currency devaluation, and instead having to resort to public spending and debt. 
This article highlights many of the problems facing France and concludes with doubt about the economic 
situation, ending with “France, rather than Italy or Spain could be where the euro’s fate is decided. Mr. 
Hollande does not have long to defuse the time-bomb at the heart of Europe.”  I was very much influenced by 
this article, and this paper differs as the I plan  to go in more depth about the problems brought up by this 
article.  
The Financial Times published an article, “France Unveils Sweeping Plan to Revive Flagging Industrial 
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Base,” about the Socialist government’s efforts to appeal to pro-business voters.  In the article, Hugh Carnegy 
describes the 10-year industrial policy he hopes will be a pragmatic approach to reducing the deficit and 
creating growth. Carnegy describes the plan as “an effort to stimulate activity at a time when unemployment is 
rising towards 11 percent of the workforce and the economy is struggling to recover from recession.”  This 
article was useful to the author by outlining a specific example of Hollande’s attempt to quell the recession. 
The author plans to approach the subject more holistically in this paper, by looking at the situation in more 
detail.  
 “The Rise of the Far Right: a European Problem Requiring European Solutions”, by John Palmer first 
appeared in The Guardian 15 November 2013. Palmer explores the effects of the crisis in relation to the rise of 
far right political parties all across Europe. Palmer focuses on Marine Le Pen of Front National and Geert 
Wilders, of the Dutch Party of Liberty (PVV).  In the article Palmer explores the notion that austerity measures 
have a direct relation to the “revival of the far right.”  Palmer contrasts The National Front and t he Dutch Party 
of Liberty, showing the former to be the more extreme of the two, but also demonstrates how they have 
worked together to form an alliance. This article accurately exposes the connections between the economic 
turmoil felt across Europe and the ability of the far right to appeal to voters feeling the sting of austerity. 
Palmer’s article differs from this paper in that he focuses on France and the Netherlands, while this paper will 
focus solely on France, with occasional comparison to Germany. This author also differs from Palmer in that 
this paper will analyze economic factors in more specific detail. 
Competitive Threat and Intergroup Contact are two theories deconstructed by Daniel Della Posta’s 
“Competitive Threat, Intergroup Contact, or Both? Immigration and the Dynamics of Front National Voting in 
France.” The article’s central question is: what changed between the 2002 and 2007 elections to lower the 
Front National’s performance? In 2002, Front National, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of 
elections in a run off against Jacques Chirac, the incumbent president.  Shields also argues that in the final run 
off in 2002, more votes were cast as votes against Le Pen, rather than votes for Chirac, which supports the 
strategic voting theory that other authors have mentioned. Nicolas Sarkozy’s tactic was to be a “rival” to Le Pen, 
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albeit one with more moderate views. By overlapping on many of the same issues, such as immigration and 
national identity, Sarkozy was able to attract voters with his similar but less-extreme rhetoric. The theoretical 
significance of Posta’s article, along with its historical deconstruction of the 2002-2009 period in French 
elections make it an important piece in the subject of European politics. 
Transitioning to more current, journalistic sources, the next piece appeared in the Wall Street Journal in 
October 2014. Entitled “Germany, France Tap Economists for Advice to Avoid ‘Lost Decade’”, the authors, 
Harriet Torry and William Horobin highlight the prolonged economic woes facing France, and the struggle to get 
a 2015 budget approved. Torry and Horobin report that France is resistant to implementing austerity measures, 
especially raising new taxes and cutting additional spending. This is creating a conflict as the deficit is growing 
and the new budget only proposes to slightly lower the deficit, while E.U. leaders are demanding more 
significant budget cuts. This ongoing back and forth between the E.U. and leadership in Paris is important to 
highlight the reality of France’s economic troubles, and the position they are stuck in by being members of a 
currency union, giving Paris less control over its own finances than if they were fiscally independent. 
In The Economist, an article appearing on 24 October 2014 entitled “The Big Chill” examines the state 
of Foreign Direct Investment in France. According to The Economist, France used to be the world’s largest 
recipient of FDI, but now only accounts for 17% of global investment. Of those companies investing, very few 
are satisfied with the investment. The Economist focuses on American companies and notes that only 12% of all 
US FDI to France would rate as “satisfied,” this is mostly due to the high level of taxes which makes the 
investment in France unappealing. President Hollande has vowed to make France a more attractive place to do 
business for foreign companies, and has promised to lower taxes, but many investors are still weary until 
change actually happens.  This article is important because it highlights one of the many economic issues facing 
France. In a country that does not want to adhere to austerity measures, as seen in the last article from the 
Wall Street Journal, FDI is a crucial way to trim the deficit. If France is not seen as a good place to do business, 
then its options for economic recovery look slimmer and slimmer. 
An article appearing on Time.com 7 January 2015, by Charlotte McDonald-Gibson entitled “Europe’s 
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Anti-Immigrant Parties Make Hay From Paris Terror Attack” analyses’ the response of the leading far right 
parties across Europe, notably PVV’s Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, UKIP’S Nigel Farage of the UK, and FN’s 
Marine Le Pen of France. Though the leaders all differ slightly in their rhetoric, with Wilders making the most 
extreme comments of the bunch, calling for the “de-Islamization” of Europe, they are all similar in their 
readiness to capitalize on the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris on 7 January 2015. Le Pen’s comments 
appear less extreme and more in line with President Hollande’s, as she notes that the terrorist attacks were 
carried out in the name of “radical Islam.” McDonald-Gibson argues that all of these far right parties have their 
roots in the financial crisis of 2008, and with dwindling and negative growth, plus high unemployment rates, 
migrants become easy scapegoats to support the far right’s arguments. 
This overview of the field of far right political ideology has offered several varying arguments for 
defining the radical right, as well as offering several answers for why some populist parties are more successful 
in certain countries rather than others. The first question, what is the radical right, is one that does not have a 
clear, universally agreed upon answer. The naming in itself has proven to be problematic, with the variety in 
nomenclature ranging from far right on one end, to radical right populist parties on the other, with several 
other identifications in the middle.  I tend to agree with Cas Mudde in “The Ideology of the Extreme Right” in 
that analyzing these parties on a “family” basis, rather than on an individual basis is problematic. If we do not 
study these parties individually, many of the country specific factors, such as cultural and economic conditions 
are ignored. While I agree that many of these parties share macro similarities, in that, as Kriesi et. al. argue, 
they appeal to losers of globalization, I also agree with Betz and Immerfall’s argument that party organization 
and leadership are both crucial to the national success of these far right parties.  For the purposes of my 
argument, I will assume this position: the radical right is a political ideology focused preserving national identity 
through socially and politically exclusionary measures while rejecting globalization and limiting the influence of 
the outside on its people. I do 
As for the second question, I assert that radical right parties are more successful in some countries than 
they are in others due to certain conditions being at play simultaneously: having a strong leader focused on the 
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party’s public image, coupled with particular external circumstances, such as economic crisis and identity 
insecurity. For the Western European countries, the situation is particularly unique, because they have the 
added circumstance of being part of a controversial political and economic union. I believe that being a 
member of the European Union/Eurozone has increased the activity amongst radical right movements in 
Western Europe. The parties that dominate the field of radical right in Europe all share a common characteristic 
in that they are on the “fringe” with only some recently becoming “mainstream.” For example, the Front 
National is clearly one of the most popular parties in France, however, they are consistently ostracized from the 
mainstream. An example of this is not being invited to the 11 January 2015 march of solidarity against the 
Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks. In other countries, such as the UK, the far right is beginning to be recognized in 
the mainstream, such as when UKIP’s Farage was invited to the BBC debate vs. Liberal Democrat leader Nick 
Clegg. However, UKIP has a much smaller percentage of government seats than Front National.  This 
inconsistency in public and political acceptance of the far right is one reason why there is currently no far right 
party with a majority rule. 
My research differs from the texts covered in this literature review because it will focus on one party’s 
leader, Marine Le Pen of the Front National, and will unpack the question of whether the Front National can 
really be considered “radical right,” given that they seem to be in a lane of their own in many of the policies 
offered by the Le Pen’s, most notably having a clearly leftist economic agenda, while still promoting an 
exclusionary form of nationalism, something more in line with the traditional far right.  In addition, nationalism 
as it relates to identity is historically embedded in French culture and the desire to preserve “Frenchness” is not 
new nor is it a radical idea.  Also the previous literature does not mention the worsening economic situation as 
an important reason for the surge of Marine Le Pen’s populist party, while my thesis analyzes this renaissance 
of populism in France in a holistic way including economic, political and social standpoints. 
CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL THEORY AND HISTORICAL PARTY RELATIONS 
 
        The third chapter will cover the history of the Front National in the framework of the populist right in 
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Western Europe as a whole, as well as the theoretical basis of the research project. To bring the focus back to 
France, the third chapter will cover the Front National party’s political framework through a historical lens, 
including a profile on the party’s former leader, Jean Marie Le Pen, and an account of their varied election 
performances and running platforms over time. The third chapter will next cover a brief discussion of the state 
of French politics, in order to establish an understanding of the climate in which Front National is existing; this 
portion will be focused on the financial crisis and the different leadership styles of President’s Sarkozy and 
Hollande. In this section, it will be vital to demonstrate my knowledge of political theory, most specifically 
covering the following topics: populism, nationalism, and integration theory. This chapter will present major 
theories and also distinguish the Front National from other right wing parties across Europe. 
 Understanding the political theory behind far right populist movements and the historical beginnings of 
the Front National are essential to understanding the current framework of events. To begin, I offer my own 
definition of the far right in order to establish a baseline for understanding. I define the far right as a political 
ideology focused preserving national identity through socially and politically exclusionary measures while 
rejecting globalization and limiting the influence of the outside on its people. From that definition, the 
personalities of many of the parties discussed in Chapter One begin to take form in a more singular and 
coherent way. Using this definition to understand these parties as individuals under a larger umbrella of party 
family affiliation is critical to analyzing each party in particular. This definition includes the phrase “preserving 
national identity,” and nationalism as a concept is one of the foundational themes seen across all of the 
populist parties.  
In France, and elsewhere, nationalism is often regarded as a product of modernity. A tool used both 
positively and negatively by nations to unify, rally and coerce the public consciousness on the merits of 
nationhood. In France, nationalism has roots in the French Revolution that still permeate culture and politics to 
this day. Essential to constructing nationalism was Napoleon Bonaparte’s crusade to unify the country to create 
what we now see as “France,” and transitioned the population from a diverse group of regions with individual 
languages and customs to a unified whole. This unification was achieved namely through creating a national 
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education system, in which all children, whether from Brittany, Provence, or Paris, all learned according to the 
same set of national standards, in French, rather than a regional dialect. The education system was critical in 
developing a nation of French speaking citizens, and was by far the most integral action in the move towards 
the construction of modern France. Though a construct of modernity, Nationalism has remained a powerful 
means to unite large numbers of citizens. This can be used as a tool of politics and government, particularly in 
times of war or crisis.  
Issues of Identity, Assimilation and Tolerance 
After two centuries of war, French national identity was both solidified and interrupted again in the 
post-war world. In the 1960’s, immigrants from many former colonies came to live across Europe, and with so 
many territories in Northern Africa as well as the Caribbean, France was no exception to this sudden 
diversification. This insurgence of cultures heightened national anxieties, causing hostility towards the new 
immigrants. From the early days of the Front National, Jean Marie Le Pen, the party’s founder and father of 
current party leader Marine Le Pen, preached against the societal ills of immigration and called for a return to 
“Frenchness,” something allegedly disrupted by this incoming diversification. Jean Marie Le Pen focused his 
attention on the characterization of the immigrant population and centered his rhetoric around the 
unassimilated immigrant, who was the “anathema to the construction of society predicated on shared moral 
preconcepts, sublime cultural distinction and dark historical fears and aspiration” (Holmes 2000). As Douglas 
Holmes argues, the goal of Le Pen’s insurgency was not just mere bigotry, but rather to construct the Front 
National policy of “National Preference.” Something described as “giving priority to those deemed to be French 
in almost every aspect of economic and social life eradicating virtually any political rights for immigrants” 
(Holmes 2000). This perceived threat to national identity, manifested in this anti-immigrant narrative which 
seeks to strip immigrants of political, economic and social rights, is one of the uniting features of all of the 
populist right parties discussed in this project, and they all share this message in common, to varying degrees.  
Holmes contends that the success of such radical right politicians can be traced back to the “politicizing of 
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integralist fears and aspirations” (Holmes 2000).  Holmes cites the “unfolding of advanced European political 
and economic integration that is manifest in the project to create a multiracial and multicultural European 
Union” as a main reason for the socioeconomic forms of estrangement that have been previously discussed in 
this paper (Holmes 2000).  According to Wendy Brown, one reason for the problamitization of immigration 
across Europe is the threat of outside cultures eroding traditional ethnic identities. As a result, the concept of 
“tolerance” began to work its way into political vernacular, disguised as a peaceful means of coexistence, 
despite racially and economically divided societies (Brown 2006).  For Brown, the use of tolerance is merely a 
tool of power, and its effects are two-fold: a state can claim to be tolerant of different cultures (despite actions 
of intolerance still occurring within that state), and a state can claim to be tolerant and use it as an excuse to 
take action against “intolerant” societies (Brown 2006). For the countries discussed in this project, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Greece and United Kingdom, this argument certainly holds true.  There is a paradoxical 
relationship between the ideals of the European Union project and the reality for non-native Europeans living 
in the E.U. These dichotomous concepts, between tolerance and intolerance, native EU and non-EU, us vs other, 
are used by political parties as tools, but have real life implications on the actual subjects of the dialogue. While 
it strives for equality and multiculturalism, the actual myriad of people trying to join European culture are often 
rejected and systematically marginalized, be it through employment opportunities, housing allotment and 
educational possibilities.   
Creation of the EU and Recent Political Landscape in France 
 
 
 The creation of the European Union unintentionally disrupted national unity across the most 
cohesively nationalist countries in European, such as France, as the project aimed to economically, politically 
and socially unite the continent in order to preserve peace and cooperation. With that being said, France 
played an integral role in the construction of the EU. A nationalist in his own right, Charles De Gaulle’s efforts to 
“constantly protect France’s national interests” were subdued in exchange for the common market and 
transnational cooperation which the EU fostered (Kramer 2011).  Representing France in the creation of the 
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Eurozone was President Jacques Chirac. Although he once considered himself an “anti-European Gaullist,” he 
was instrumental in the creation of the Euro, and became a “champion of the single currency” (BBC 2011). 
President Chirac represented the conservative “Union for a Popular Movement” Party (UNP), which was a 
spawn of several other parties consolidated into one, including Chirac’s self-created party, “Rally for the 
Republic,” (RPR) (BBC 2011).  Chirac’s predecessor, Socialist President Francois Mitterrand, was heavily 
influential in the creation of the European Union. After so many years under a Socialist leader, the people of 
France turned to Chirac and his right-wing ideals. Although in good political standing in 2002, by the time the 
European Union constitution was brought to a referendum vote in France, in 2005, the French people had 
begun to express their doubts with Presdient Chirac, and the European integration (BBC 2005).  Voters in France 
turned out in large numbers to vote “oui” or “non” on the referendum. By ultimately rejecting the constitution, 
the people of France also rejected President Chirac’s position. This rejection came about because of 
“dissatisfaction” bubbling under the surface in France, being “plagued for years by high unemployment and 
uncertainty over who should belong in the European club” (BBC 2005). The voters had expressed their 
disapproval, and in 2007 would turn out once again to favor a new leader, Nicolas Sarkozy.  
 If the tides were turning under President Chirac, with regards to the French position of the integrated 
Eurozone, they came to a crashing halt under President Sarkozy. President Sarkozy was not dissimilar from Pre-
sent Chirac in that they both represented the conservative UNP party. They were political rivals, however. Sar-
kozy was elected in May 2007, a year of great economic prosperity (BBC 2014). Only a year later, in the sum-
mer of 2008, would Sarkozy be put to the test in his handling of the Global Economic Crisis of 2008. President 
Sarkozy was “at the forefront of the European response to the global economic crisis in 2008 and helped estab-
lish the G20 summits involving the world's biggest economies,” according to BBC News (BBC 2014).  Hard hit by 
the crisis, Sarkozy turned to reforms to help France recover from the economic downturn. Though extremely 
unpopular, these reforms were arguably necessary, including “raising the retirement age from 60 to 62, relax-
ing the 35-hour working week, overhauling the universities and altering the tax system to encourage overtime 
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and home ownership” (BBC 2014).  For a welfare-state nation so historically against conservative reforms, Sar-
kozy’s attempt to quell the economic struggle was faced with massive popular unrest. People took to the 
streets in protest of the retirement age being raised, and went on strike in incredible numbers. In September of 
2010, over one million workers protested the pension reforms (BBC 2010).  Among the striking workers were 
teachers, which affect school’s closing, and Air France employees, which disrupted “short and medium haul 
flights” (BBC 2010).  President Sarkozy’s cabinet defended his decision. For example, Labour Minister Eric 
Woerth warned that if the pension reform bill was not passed, “then tomorrow there will be no money left to 
pay the French pensions” (BBC 2010). Nicolas Sarkozy’s conservative reforms continued to receive backlash 
from the French people, who did not reelect him in the elections of 2012, instead returning to a Socialist lead-
er, Francois Hollande.  
The election of Socialist President Francois Hollande was a reactionary effort by the French voting pub-
lic. After angering voters with pension reforms and carrying on with a lavish and flashy lifestyle in the midst of 
recession, voters had had enough of Sarkozy and turned to Hollande.  Voters saw Hollande as the opposite of 
Sarkozy, a Socialist promising to lead France out of the recession by offering an alternatively lefist economic 
adgenda. A longtime politician, Francois Hollande joined the Socialist party in 1979, and served as an economic 
advisor to Francois Mitterand  (BBC 2014).He has been a Member of Parliament since 1998, and is seen as hav-
ing crossover appeal, as praised by Jacques Chirac in his memoir, stating Hollande is a "true statesman, capable 
of crossing party lines” (BBC 2014).  One of Hollande’s most grandiose campaign promises, which appealed to 
the struggling workers of France, was imposing a 75% income tax rate on those making over 1 million Euros per 
year (Economist 2012). Hollande also gained support in his open criticism of German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and her push for austerity measures.  Although, as the economic crisis shows no sign of slowing, reforms will be 
necessary at some point, leaving President Hollande with a difficult challenge of balancing the Socialist ideals 
on which he was elected, preserving his own legacy and rescuing the reputation of France as it dips deeper and 
deeper into economic disaster. The Economist sums up the challenges faced by President Hollande “Mr Hol-
lande was elected on a promise to kick-start growth, cut unemployment and end austerity. Now he presides 
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over recession, rising joblessness—and the need to impose more austerity on dumbfounded voters” (Econo-
mist 2012).  Hollande’s approval rating has remained consistently low, holding the record for lowest approval 
rating of a French President (Economist 2012). Polls have Hollande taking third place in the 2017 Presidential 
election, behind Sarkozy and Le Pen, something that is discussed in further detail in Chapter Five.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND ITS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 Amongst the many reasons offered for explaining the rise of the far right in France, the economy seems 
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to be the most commonly cited rationale. Since 2008, the French economy has seen a slowdown, leaving France 
to be associated more with the dreaded “PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain)” or “peripheral,” rather 
than the richer, northern classification of countries. France has been called the “new sick man of Europe,” by 
major news outlets, including the Guardian, Al Jazeera and Forbes, an embarrassing title to the prideful French 
people. It's not just media attention that has put France's destitute economic situation in the limelight. The 
statistics speak for themselves, as France has seen negative growth and shockingly high unemployment in the 
years since the financial crisis. Without much control over their own economy, French politicians have tried to 
implement certain austerity type measures, such as raising the retirement age and cutting pensions, to the 
dismay of the people, who have taken to the streets in protests of these changes. This chapter will analyze the 
economic conditions affecting France, comparing the past several years of data to the European countries 
previously mentioned in Chapter One. The chapter will conclude by drawing relationships between the 
worsening economic situations with the increasing vote for Front National and the other extreme parties 
depending on the country, and summarizing observable correlations.  
 The table below presents an outline of the major economic indicators from 2009-2014. The data is 
taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit Data Tool. In order to have a general understanding of the economic 
outlook in France, I will analyze each economic factor before comparing France’s situation with the other four 
countries, and finally, comparing economic indicators with political data.  
Table 1 
French Economic Indicators    2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
GDP (% real change pa)   -2.9 1.9 2.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Labour productivity growth (%) - [Y] -1.7 1.8 1.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 
Public debt  (% of GDP)   78.7 81.5 85.0 89.3 92.2 95.7 
Recorded unemployment (%)   8.7 8.9 8.8 9.4 9.9 9.7 
Source: EIU Data Tool         
Growth in France following the 2008 financial crisis has been dismal. Immediately after the crisis, in 
2009, GDP was actually negative, at -2.9% growth. France’s declining economy saw a slight “rebound” in 2010 
and 2011, before shrinking back to less than 1% growth in 2012-2014.  Labour Productivity follows a similar 
pattern to GDP, with negative growth in 2009, followed by a slight improvement in 2010-2011, and another dip 
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from 2012-2014. Public debt has been creeping up to startlingly high numbers, much outside of the 
recommend levels. 2009’s public debt was not outrageously high, but notice that every year since then, public 
debt has risen. As of 2014, it was at 95.7% of GDP, putting France in the same economic category as the 
struggling peripheral counties of Europe. Finally, unemployment has been on the rise in France, with national 
levels at 9.7 in 2014. This figure, however, doesn’t tell the whole story of the dreary employment situation in 
France. Below, the statistics for youth unemployment tell an even more worrisome tale, with levels reaching as 
high as 26% in 2013.  
 
Chart 1 
 
The youth unemployment rate peaked in 2013, but has hovered above the 21% mark for the past 
several years, since 2009. At the end of 2014, levels were back on the rise, over 25% of youths looking for work 
in France were without a job.  
Overall, the economic situation in France is a dire one. Many supporters of FN blame this on the 
European Union and common currency. The economic situation facing France is challenging, as multiple factors 
are working against the potential for recovery and growth. Eurozone membership has increased dependency on 
the rest of Europe, in particularly, Germany, and has prevented the French government from implementing 
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external measures of economic control. For example, if France were still economically independent, as it was 
prior to the 2002 adaptation of the common currency, the government would have the ability to reduce 
imports, create export subsidies, generate tax incentives and devalue its currency, in order to curb the deficit 
and stimulate growth. Because of their reliance on the Euro, however, the options to get a handle on the 
economy are limited. The president’s must rely on internal adjustment measures, which infringe on democracy 
and are politically unpopular. Fortune Magazine highlights this issue, “France epitomizes the real problem with 
the single currency: The inability of nations with high and rising production costs to adjust their currencies so 
that their products remain competitive in world markets” (Tully 2013).  Some of these measures have already 
been seen in France, for instance, applying contractionary fiscal policy, reducing spending by way of austerity 
measures. 
These measures have so far been extremely unpopular in France, as in the case of pension reform 
introduced by President Sarkozy. President Hollande has taken to raising taxes to the wealthy, an effort that has 
exhausted the French workers so much that even Monsieur Hollande recently admitted that the over taxation 
on ordinary workers had gotten out of control. The tax increases since 2011 totaled 60 billion Euros, which is 
the equivalent to 3% of the national income (Tully 2013).  In a television interview, President Hollande promised 
a tax pause, a promise which was echoed by Finance Mister Pierre Moscovici, who has said that he is “very 
conscious that the French are fed up with taxes” (Tully 2013).  This increase in taxation is a negative result of 
having a common currency, as it is one of the only economic measures the French government can directly 
control. Elsewhere in economic recovery, President Hollande and his Socialist government are noticing that they 
will have to reconcile their interventionist instincts “with a more pro-business approach” (Tully 2013). In 
September, 2013, President Hollande unveiled his ten year plan, meant to generate industrial growth, which 
supports “no fewer than 34 sectors, spanning new technologies in areas ranging from renewable energy to 
robotics and medical biotech” (Carnegy 2013). Over the last decade, France has lost “750,000 manufacturing 
jobs…slipped from a trade surplus to a heavy deficit and lost ground to neighboring competitors” (Carnegy 
2013) Hollande calls this plan pragmatic, and is championing a “Made in France” campaign, an effort to bring 
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back jobs to the country that have recently been outsourced to more business friendly economies. President 
Hollande asked the EU’s help in his business plan, calling on the EU to “change its competition doctrine to allow 
companies to merge more easily to ‘promote European champions’ and to adopt a trade policy ‘worthy of the 
name, to combat vigorously unfair trade practices, both internal and external” (Carnegy 2013).  
The next section in this chapter will contain various sets of data comparing France with the four 
countries selected for analysis: Britain, Sweden, Netherlands and Greece.  The first selection for comparison is 
GDP.  
Chart 2 
 
Source: EIU Data Tool 
As seen by the above graph, France’s GDP is somewhere in the middle of the countries used for 
comparison in this project. By far, the United Kingdom and Sweden are doing the best in terms of growth, 
though this fact is not surprising, as neither country is a member of the Eurozone, and therefore has more 
control over fiscal policy. The UK and Sweden both are able to implement economic policy which helps combat 
the effects of the recession, rather than depending on policy from Brussels. This control over their own 
economy also means that they have seen less devastating effects from the crisis than their Eurozone 
incorporated neighbors. On the other hand, Greece is the clearest example of a drastically suffering economy. 
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Although as of 2014, they were starting to see a slowdown of the shrinking. The Netherlands have also 
obviously suffered, as they experienced a series of negative growth from 2011-2013, but seem to be on the 
rebound.  
 The next factor for comparison is Public Debt.  
 
  Chart 3 
  
Source: EIU Data Tool 
The first thing that stands out in the above chart is Greece’s public debt levels, which hover around 
175%, an enormous and troubling number. Note that France has the second highest amount of public debt out 
of these five countries. The UK and France have very similar levels, with the UK doing a slightly better job 
keeping those numbers down. The Netherlands, although in the Eurozone, has managed to keep its public debt 
quite low, and Sweden, unsurprisingly, has the lowest public debt out of these countries.  
The final factor for comparison is recorded unemployment.  
 
  Chart 4 
 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
0.00 
20.00 
40.00 
60.00 
80.00 
100.00 
120.00 
140.00 
160.00 
180.00 
200.00 
Public Debt/GDP 2009-2014 
France Greece Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom 
35 
 
 
Source: EIU Data Tool 
Unemployment rate levels are unsurprisingly high in Greece, with levels peaking above 25%. The 
growth of unemployment in Greece is also striking, as in 2009, just following the economic crisis, four out of 
five of the countries were experiencing similar levels, but from 2010 to 2014, Greek unemployment has made 
incredibly drastic leaps.  Dutch unemployment, in contrast, has been relatively low, certainly the lowest out of 
these five countries. French unemployment has been the second highest, compared to Greece, although not 
nearly has high. Sweden and the UK, have seen unemployment levels at steady and similar rates across the past 
several years. In order to make sense the of effect economics has had on the political world, the next section 
will include the results from the two most recent European Parliament elections, 2014 and 2009. This 
demonstration will show the same period (2009-2014) politically, and offer an example of the very real political 
consequences the economic situation can have.  
 
Political Consequences of Economic Downturns 
 
The following set of charts will display the most recent European Election results, which took place on 
May 26, 2014. The most major parties of each country were included in the data, and “other” indicates the 
parties which received less than 2% of the vote. Some of these countries have over thirty five different parties 
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competing in the election, so the “other” category is filled with these smaller parties who may have received 
1% of the vote, but are overall not relevant to the argument of this paper. Note that the party that is a subject 
of this thesis is in violet for quick identification.  
Most central to this project is the French result, which will be observed in much greater detail in the 
following chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, note immediately that the Front National placed first, with 
25% of the vote. While UMP earned 21%, Socialist earned only 14%. FN and UMP together make up almost 50% 
of the total vote, signifying a general shift to the right, with the most sizeable amount shifting to the far right. 
This fact is integral to both parties strategy going forward into the 2017 general election.  
Compare the 2014 results with the 2009 results, as seen below and note the dramatic difference in the 
showing of support for Front National.  
Table 2 
 
France  European Parliament Election Results  
  UMP Socialist 
Democratic 
Movement 
Europe 
Ecologie 
Left Front 
Front Na-
tional 
Other 
2009 28% 16% 8% 16% 6% 6% 20% 
2014 21% 14% 10% 9% 6% 25% 15% 
 
Source: European Parliament: europa.eu 
 
Relating this political data back to economics, note that public debt and unemployment both rose in 
France from 2009-2014, so the economic influence is certainly there. Another important observation is where 
the support for Front National came from in the five year period of 2009-2014. UMP and Europe Ecologie saw 
the biggest decline in support. Where support for the Front National came from is integral to understanding the 
rationale behind voting FN, because for a sizeable percentage of voters who chose FN in 2014, they had to 
make the decision to vote against the party that previously held their allegiance.  
 
The following several tables will serve as an overview of other European countries, however, it must be 
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emphasized that the primary objective of this paper is France, and as a complement to the economic, political 
and social results in France, other European countries will be analyzed in Greece, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom. 
The next table compares Greece in 2014 and 2009. The most immediate observation is how Syriza 
seems to have come out of the blue to gain 26% of the vote in 2014.  
2014 and 2009 in Greece show many major political changes, many of the parties that competed in 
2009 were nowhere to be found in 2014. Of course, Greece has gone through several changes economically, as 
both their economy and the EU imposed austerity measures have been disastrous, which was demonstrated in 
the graphs on the previous several pages. Note that Greece had over 35 political parties competing in this 
election, with most of them only receiving 1% or less than 1% of the vote, which makes the “other” group so 
significant, although no party in this category earned over 2% of the vote by itself.  
 
Table 3 
Greece European Parliament Election Results  
  
New De-
mocracy 
Syriza 
Golden 
Dawn 
Olive 
Tree 
The 
River 
Communist Other 
Panhellenic 
Socialist 
Movement 
2009 32% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 8% 37% 
2014 23% 26% 9% 8% 8% 6% 20% 0% 
 
Source: European Parliament: europa.eu 
In the case of Greece, it can be observed that the economic crisis has dramatically changed the face of 
Greek politics. With the incumbent leadership’s party, New Democracy, losing almost 10% of its support in the 
EP elections over the five year period seen above. Syriza and it’s mission to challenge the EU head on has seen 
the biggest benefit from the economic crisis. It is important to note that Syriza did not simply see a dramatic 
increase in votes, although they did generate a large amount of new support over the course of the two 
elections. Syriza was made out of a combination of much smaller parties, which explains its inception and large 
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support.  
Next, the United Kingdom’s election results from EP elections, 2014 and 2009.  
 
Table 4 
 
United Kingdom European Parliament Election Results  
  Conservative UKIP Labor 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Greens 
British Na-
tional Party 
Scottish Na-
tional Party 
Other 
2009 28% 17% 16% 14% 8% 6% 2% 9% 
2014 23% 27% 24% 7% 7% 0% 2% 10% 
 
Source: European Parliament: europa.eu 
The United Kingdom has seen a similar spike in support for the far right party, UKIP. Most recently, in 
2014, UKIP earned 27% of the EP election vote, compared with 2009 when they earned 17%. This 10% increase 
in support came at a cost for the two parties in particular: Conservatives and BNP. UKIP has long been 
campaigning to earn disenchanted conservatives, who see the country’s current conservative party, led by 
Prime Minister David Cameron, as showing sympathy to immigrants and being more and more pro-EU 
integration. Note that in the five year period between elections, Conservatives lost 5% of their support, and 
these voters most likely went to UKIP because of their nationalist, pro-Britain and anti-Europe perspective. BNP, 
or British National Party, is regarded as both extreme and racist in message, but at the same time, they are 
often grouped together with UKIP, who have denounced the party and its sympathizers. In 2009, BNP earned 
6% of the vote, and in 2014, earned less than 1%, It seems that many of these former BNP voters may have 
gone to UKIP, who have altogether more support and therefore a more realistic chance at leadership, 
parliament seats and therefore, legislative power.   
 
 
The next country to observe is Sweden. Note that support for the Sweden Democrats, the adamantly 
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anti-immigration, extremely nationalist party, saw support stay the same in the five year period between EP 
elections.  
Table 5 
 
Sweden European Parliament Election Results  
  
Social Demo-
cratic 
Liberal 
People 
Moderate Greens 
Sweden 
Democrats 
Feminist 
Christian 
Dem 
Left 
Centre 
2009 24% 14% 19% 11% 3% 2% 5% 6% 0.05 
2014 27% 16% 21% 12% 3% 2% 6% 7% 0.06 
 
Source: European Parliament: europa.eu 
Comparing results in Sweden, notice that most of the parties saw no change in support, save for some 
of the smaller parties. The supporters of these smaller parties seem to have consolidated their votes to have a 
better chance at representation. It is important to note that Sweden has survived the financial crisis very well, 
seeing low public debt and low unemployment, so these results are not surprising.  
The last set of election results that will be observed in this chapter is for the Netherlands. In the 
Netherlands, we see a curious thing happen that is not in line with many of the other countries and their 
increase in support for the most dominant anti-Europe party. Support for PVV, Party for Freedom, actually 
declined in the years of 2009-2014. Looking back at some of the economic data provided in the previous pages, 
recall that while growth has stalled and unemployment has increased, the Netherlands still maintain the lowest 
unemployment rate of any of the other countries for comparison in this project. Additionally, much like 
Sweden, the Netherlands have maintained low public debt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
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Netherlands European Parliament Election Results  
  
Christian 
Democratic 
Appeal 
PVV Labour 
Democrats 
66 
Socialist 
Green 
Left 
Party for 
Freedom & 
Democracy 
Other 
2009 20% 17% 12% 11% 7% 9% 11% 6% 
2014 15% 13% 9% 15% 10% 9% 12% 10% 
 
 
Source: European Parliament: europa.eu 
In the Netherlands, it seems that economics has played a main role in the fate of the far right. In this 
case, the positive economic outlook, relative to the other four countries being compared in this study, has 
negatively affected the popular support for Eurosceptic PVV.  
Recently, in March 2015 I had the opportunity to travel to Brussels, home of the European Union, to 
partake in a study abroad program led by DePaul’s School of Public Service. This incredibly unique experience 
allowed me to take my questions to the source, as we met with a plethora of prominent European leaders and 
public figures, including the Ambassadors of Austria, Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia, in addition to leaders of 
non-profits and the EU press secretary. On multiple occasions, I was able to ask about the impact of the rise of 
the far right on European policy, and on all of these occasions, my hypothesis was met with confirmation, that 
yes, these parties are seen as a very real, viable threat to European policy as a whole. In Brussels, the recent 
surge in popularity for the Euroskeptics is a great concern, and the ways to solve the issue are hotly debated. 
On one hand, these parties represent popular dissatisfaction with the direction of the European Union, on the 
other, they also represent a reaction to the poor leadership of some of the major parties. From an EU level, the 
question is not how to stop these parties from being successful, but rather, how to manage and work with 
these parties once they make in into parliament. These leaders often come with the intention of blocking 
legislation and disrupting the progress being made at the supranational level, so how to integrate these parties 
and their agendas into the European level of policy making becomes a challenge.  
This chapter has presented a fusion of economic data and political results, focusing solely on the 2014 
and 2009 European Parliament election results. This section has presented different findings which relate 
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directly back to this project’s main hypothesis. First among these findings is all of the countries observed, 
France, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and Greece, were negatively affected by the 2008 Economic 
crisis, and in the case of all but the Netherlands, support for the Euro-skeptic parties rose or stayed the same in 
that same period. France, Greece, and the United Kingdom saw the biggest gains in support for FN, Syriza and 
UKIP in the 2009-2014 period, while Sweden Democrats earned the same amount of votes. This juxtaposition of 
economic and political data has shown that the economic situation of a country does affect its political 
outcome, and can make a difference in voters deciding to support parties such as the far right Front National or 
UKIP, or the far left, Syriza, all parties which share the common goal to distance their country from ties with the 
European Union. On the other hand, this chapter has shown that in countries whose economies have emerged 
from the crisis relatively successfully, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, there is a neutral or negative inter-
relation between the votes for the anti-Europe parties, Sweden Democrats and Party for Freedom.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLITICAL OUTCOMES AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES   
 
 This section will be broken into two parts, the first spent considering the political mechanisms 
employed by the Front National to infiltrate mainstream French politics, and the second spent analyzing the 
effect this recent surge in support has had on the social situation in France.  The political section will be 
dedicated to answering two of the central questions posed in the introduction chapter, those are: How has the 
Front National infiltrated politics, and, can the Front National really be considered a 'far right' party, when their 
economic platform is not entrenched in a classically populist agenda? 
 As mentioned in the third chapter, Front National has had its ups and downs in terms of popular 
support, cumulating in the 2002 presidential election, making it to the second round of elections. Recall that 
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National suffered a tremendous defeat in the final election runoff in 2002, only 
receiving 18% of the vote, while Jacques Chirac earned 82%. The Front National have undergone a massive 
overhaul since that time, with the elder Le Pen retreating from the spotlight a bit and his daughter, Marine Le 
Pen, officially taking over as party leader in 2011.  
One of the most notable showings of support for the far-right occurred in the 2012 Presidential 
election, the first presidential election that preceded the recession. The first round of elections saw Marine Le 
Pen competing against the sitting president, Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist candidate Francois Hollande. Le Pen 
came in third overall, with 17. 9%. By comparison, the next-closest party, the Left Front, only earned 11.10%.  
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Chart 5 
 
Source: Constitutional Council of France 
To contrast with the previous presidential election, in 2007, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front 
National came in fourth place with only 10.44% of votes. 
 
Chart 6 
 
Source: Constitutional Council of France 
As argued in the previous chapter about economics, the period of 2009-2014 was marked by recession 
and a shrinking economy, coupled with high debt and high unemployment. These findings can be used to 
partially explain the surge in support for Front National from 2007-2012 in the general election. During the 
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crisis, center right President Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a Popular Movement party (UMP) tried to steer 
France out of recession, to no avail. Not surprisingly, Sarkozy was not reelected in the presidential elections of 
2012. Instead, Socialist Francois Hollande was elected, taking 51.64% of the vote in the second round, enough 
to win the presidency. During the first round of that election, a third party emerged with a shocking number of 
votes. The far-right party, The National Front, headed by Madame Marine Le Pen, earned 17.9% of the votes, or 
6.4 million. Hollande and Sarkozy earned 28.63% and 27.18%, respectively, and the next closest alternative 
party, Left Front, with 11% of votes. What makes these poll numbers more surprising is that in the 2007 
Presidential Election, the National Front finished fourth place, only earning 10.4% of votes. The period of 2007-
2012 showed substantial improvements in the popularity of the National Front, due to worsening economic 
situations and the inability for center-right to successfully navigate the Crisis. As an alternative party, the 
National Front took advantage of factions within the center-right, as disgruntled voters looked for a party that 
could more accurately represent their concerns.  
There is growing speculation that Front National have a very substantial chance at winning the next 
general election, scheduled for 2017. Opinion polls seem to suggest that Front National will get past the first 
round and be competitive in the second round. If Le Pen enters a run off with Sarkozy, most polls show her 
losing, while some polls suggest if the run off is Le Pen v Hollande, Le Pen will win. The following map shows the 
drastic change in support for the Front National in the two consecutive European Parliament elections, 2009 
and 2014. The dark blue represents Front National, the magenta pink represents the Socialist Party, the orange 
represents UDI, Union of Democrats and Independents, or the centre right, and light blue represents UMP, 
Union for a Popular Movement.  
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Map 1 
Map of Popular Political Support Across France by Province 
 
In 2009, the majority of the country was in support of UMP, the conservative party in the European 
Parliament elections. A few pockets of support for the Socialist Party existed, particular in the North, and in the 
south . Notice that in 2009, no region was won by Front National. However, only five years later, in 2014, the 
map is nearly entirely dark blue, signifiying a huge shift in support from the centre-right to the far right as 
French voters moved to the Front National. UMP still maintained some of their spoort, particualr in Paris and in 
the east in Brittany, as well as some areas in central France. Note that voters who chose Socialists in 2009 
switched to Front National in the north and very south of France, a noticable gain as both a densely populated 
areas, particularly in the South of France. This map is useful because it provides an overview of how different 
regions of France vote in the European elections.  
Looking ahead to the 2017 general elections, the majority of polls have Marine Le Pen winning, besting 
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incumbent President Hollande and former President Sarkozy. Below, Table 7 shows the latest results from 
January 2015 presidential voting poll.  
Table 7 
PERCENTAGE OF VOTERS FOR 2017 CANDIDATES 
 
According to the poll by IFOP for Marianne, a weekly French News magazine, from July 2014 to January 
2015, Marine Le Pen has been not only leading, but increasing in popularity, rising from 26% to 29% over that 
time period, signifying that voters are becoming more supportive and additionally, less closeted about their 
support for the far right, something that has historically carried a sense of taboo.  
To get a closer look at exactly who is voting for the Front National, this next table deconstructs the 
profile of the average voter in France, by sex, age, education level and 2012 vote.  
 
 
47 
 
 
Table 8 
Voter Profiles for 2017 French Presidential Candidates 
  Hollande Sarkozy Le Pen 
TOTAL 21% 23% 29% 
Voter Breakdown 
  
  
sex 
  
  
Male 25% 15% 31% 
Female 18% 31% 26% 
age 
  
  
18-24 17% 22% 34% 
25-24 19% 37% 18% 
35-49 26% 17% 36% 
50-64 23% 13% 35% 
65 and up 17% 33% 18% 
education 
  
  
High School 15% 22% 39% 
Bachelor 25% 22% 21% 
Post-Graduate 26% 30% 13% 
2012 election vote 
  
  
Hollande 68% 4% 10% 
Sarkozy 1% 75% 12% 
Le Pen 0% 0% 98% 
    Source: IFOP for Marianne 
   
This table breaks down the voter profile to understand exactly who is voting for Le Pen, and what the 
demographics of said voters look like. Le Pen’s popularity seems to be slightly higher with men than with 
women, though only by a 5 point difference. Le Pen appeals to voters over 35 more, but isn’t doing terribly with 
younger voters, particularly with the 18-24 year old crowd.  Another notable mention is that FN voters seem to 
be those without a college degree, with 39% of their voters not attending university. Le Pen appeals to 
generally less educated, older than 35 voters, and more to men than women. Additionally, from the table, we 
can tell that FN voters tend to be extremely loyal to the party, with slight percentages from UMP and Socialists 
crossing over.  For the college educated crowd, the vote is split quite closely between Hollande and Sarkozy. 
Those with a Bachelor’s degree make up 25% of Hollande’s demographic, and 22% of Sarkozy’s demographic, 
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respectively. Both candidates do well in the post-graduate demographic, those who have completed education 
higher than a Bachelor’s degree favor Hollande (26%) and Sarkozy (30%), while only 13% of voters receiving 
post graduate education say they would vote for Marine Le Pen.  
Another hallmark characteristic of populist parties in Europe is Euroskepticism, and as was previously 
mentioned, voters for Front National tend to hold very disapproving views of the European Union, the Euro-
zone and European integration. Euro skepticism is on the rise amongst the French and is no longer a marginal 
issue. The French newspaper, La Croix, found that in 2012, 38% of French citizens felt that membership in the 
E.U. was a bad thing.  In September of 2013, however, that figure rose, with 43% of French citizens feeling that 
E.U. membership was the wrong choice for France. On the Contrary, in 2013, 33% of French citizens wanted 
France to leave the Eurozone, a figure that is slightly lower the 35% who wanted to leave the Eurozone in 2012.  
This data alludes to the fact that the people of France are largely unsatisfied with the loss of national sover-
eignty in exchange for membership in the European Union, however, it also points to a lack of understand of 
the Euro’s consequences on the French economy. Interestingly, the French population in general seems to have 
adopted more pessimistic views of Europe in the past several years, as is indicated in the following table from 
Eurobarometer, the European Commission’s polling institution.  
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Poll 1 
Future of the EU Public Opinion Poll 
 
The poll asks “Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very 
pessimistic about the future of the EU?” The results are ordered according to satisfaction. France is 
unsurprisingly at the far-right of the graph, with 56% of those polled saying they are totally pessimistic about 
the future of the EU. The only more pessimistic nations are those in the peripheral facing extreme financial 
crisis, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece.  Also note that only 40% of those polled say they are optimistic about 
the future of the EU. Contrasted with Germany’s majority of optimistic voters, 60%, the consensus in France is 
to negatively view the future of the EU. France’s optimism has decreased by -4% since the last time this poll was 
conducted, in spring 2013. This trend of increased pessimism towards the EU points to a growing frustration 
within France, and also alludes to motivations for turning to a party which supports this anti-European 
sentiment.  
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 After observing the past several elections, and speculating the outcome of the next election in 2017, as 
well as a brief discussion of the rise of Euroskepticism and its implications, the next section will interrogate why 
voters are choosing FN. One reason has already been argued in the economic chapter, as there is certainly a 
cause effect relationship between worsening economic conditions and increased votes for FN. Economics and 
politics aside, what other reasons are voters flocking to FN? The following section will offer answers to this 
question which focus primarily on the issues of immigration and cultural tensions. 
 
Social Situation and its Relation to the Front National 
 
The social portion of the fifth chapter will focus primarily on two of the biggest social issues affecting 
France, immigration and identity. Although France is experiencing a wide scope of social issues which add 
tension and malaise to the French society, these two problems are related to overarching theme of voter 
motivations and help relate incentives for voting FN back to the social situation. Approximately 1 in 10 people 
in France are immigrants (The Local 2014). This population of immigrants has seen a dramatic rise since the 
financial crisis, in particular because of the free movement of labour that European Union laws allow for. Thus, 
workers struggling to find work (largely affected by the crisis in peripheral countries such as Portugal and Italy) 
freely came to France after the crisis in 2008 (The Local 2014).  This influx of other Europeans, which represents 
approximately half of the immigrant population in France, coupled with the already high numbers of incoming 
persons from Northern Africa and the Middle East contributed to this large portion of immigrant in a country 
that has historically managed a relatively significant population of immigrants since post war times. As 
mentioned, more and more Europeans came to France seeking work in light of the 2008 crisis, but at the same 
time, France’s own economic situation was struggling, as demonstrated in Chapter Four. Historically a potent 
political issue, the “immigration issue” has been a longstanding issue on the Front National’s running platform, 
and the main leaders of FN use the issue as a rally cry when they need to attract attention to their party. Part of 
this anti-immigrant agenda includes calling for a halt on immigration and making it more difficult for those 
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already in France to obtain citizenship. With the large numbers of immigrants arriving in France, a population 
rising 1.6 percent per year, less are actually being granted French citizenship. For comparison, in 2012, 96,000 
immigrants were naturalized, a 16% decrease from 2011 (The Local 2014). This decline is in line with the wishes 
of Front National, a party who call for a “France for the French” and support largely exclusionary measures to 
achieve this.  
For the immigrants that settle in France, particularly the non-Europeans, life is largely segregated from 
the rest of the community; a phenomenon that has been labeled “the Other France” by observers (Ware 2015) 
Part of this systematic isolation includes large complexes of public housing, almost always located on the 
peripheral of the major metropolitan areas. This suburban communities are called banlieues, and are often high 
in crime, low in income and with substandard schools and education when compared to non-immigrant 
communities (Ware 2015)  
 
Identity Crisis and Violent Reactions 
 The issue of immigration has affected France for the greater part of the twentieth century, and 
certainly prevails in modern times. A society which defends the revolutionary motto of “Liberty, Equality and 
Fraternity” is really practicing exclusionary means of achieving Frenchness on particular terms. For example, 
there exists a disconnect, where immigrants, and children of immigrants, French citizens in their own right, are 
not seen as being “French.” This identity tension, a racial and cultural discrimination, has been the root of 
France’s social issues. As a political force, Front National embodies the idealistic narrative of being “French,” 
and capitalizes on insecurities in communities which fear diversity and are conflicted with this identity tension 
in everyday life.  
No example is more fitting than the January 2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo, a satirical French magazine 
that frequently features controversial cartoon images on its front cover, including the Islamic prophet, 
Muhammad kissing a Charlie Hebdo writer.  This was not the first, nor will it be the last offensive cover that the 
magazine publishers, despite the massacre of its staff on January 7 2015. In addition to the Charlie Hebdo staff, 
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a kosher market was also raided by Islamic extremist, with several people killed in the process. The attackers 
were French citizens, a fact that makes the entire episode more disturbing, as these are citizens who have 
travelled overseas to learn training needed to carry out acts of violence.  In response to this recent outpour of 
violence, President Hollande has invited his peers, including Marine Le Pen, to discuss the situation and policy 
going forward. At her meeting with the president, Le Pen pushed for the revoking of French citizenship for 
those holding dual citizenship and have travelled abroad to places like Syria to receive training, such as the 
Charlie Hebdo attackers. Le Pen also used the moment to further critique the European Union in general, 
noting that its policy of open borders and free movement of people needs to be suspended in order to fight 
terrorism and arms trafficking across member states. While Le Pen was included in the post-attack meetings 
with President Hollande, she and Front National supporters were excluded from the unity rally which took place 
11 January 2015 in response to the terrorism which plagued the city only days before. By excluding Le Pen from 
the largest public demonstration in French history, in particular one centered around “unity,” Hollande and the 
rally organizers sent a message to the Front National supporters that they were unwelcome, and being excluded 
based on their beliefs. This message is quite contradictory, as a rally for unity should include all, and by 
ostracizing Le Pen and the FN, there is a probably risk of generating more support and passion for the party.  
France has many embedded social ills it must cure in order to prevent the political takeover of the far 
right agenda. A society which lives by the historically motivated republican idealism instilled from the French 
Revolution, modern France does not embody this free and equal society any longer. With entrenched racism, 
xenophobia and discrimination, it is no surprise that the Front National has capitalized on these sentiments.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis of this thesis is the surge of the Front National’s public support is due to France’s 
deteriorating economic, social and political situations as a result of its membership within the Eurozone and 
also as a result of the country’s mismanagement by the government. This thesis was proven through a point of 
comparison with France’s situation with that of other European Union countries such as Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Greece and the United Kingdom. Additionally, this hypothesis has been proved by exploring the 
question “what are the economic, political, and social mechanisms Marine Le Pen has used to bring the Front 
National into mainstream politics, and has she succeeded?” The first category, economics, has been examined 
through an analysis of various key economic indicators and compared to other countries within Western 
Europe. There, it was proven that economic recession and financial suffering in France has given the Front 
National a boost, politically speaking. There exists a clear relationship between the economy and political 
trends. The countries which performed most successfully during the financial crisis, namely Sweden and the 
Netherlands, saw less of a spike in votes for the Eurosceptic, extreme parties in the European Parliament 
elections, such as Sweden Democrats and PVV. On the other hand, those countries who suffered the most 
economically, United Kingdom, France and Greece, saw a large increase in votes for the Eurosceptic, nationalist 
parties, such as UKIP, Front National and the far left Syriza. This relationship has been proven and supports the 
argument that the poor economy has helped boost the Front National. Marine Le Pen has used the economic 
situation to her advantage by tailoring her economic policy to be decisively different from President Hollande, 
giving herself a differentiated appeal on the economic front. This strategy is successful, as was seen in the 
political section. Front National votes are increasing because voters are growing more skeptical of Hollande’s 
attempts at reform, as they have largely been ineffective. Another political mechanism that Marine Le Pen has 
used to her advantage is her message of anti-Euro zone ideals. Le Pen openly promotes a return to the Franc, 
something that would allow France to regain external measures of monetary control over their economy in 
times of recession. As many French begin to see the Euro common currency as more of an obligation rather 
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than a benefit, this running platform has proven popular, though the details of execution of this plan remain 
unknown. In addition to the economic and political factors, social issues have proven a useful tactic to boost 
Marine Le Pen and the Front National’s public profile. In particular, tensions are high in France between those 
seen as being “true” French, and those seen as “other,” or not belonging to mainstream society because of their 
ethnic background, typically immigrants from Northern Africa. Coupled with a migration crisis, in addition to 
persistent fears of terrorist attacks, the social situation in France is volatile to say the least.  
This project has argued that the power of the Eurosceptic parties across Western Europe is undeniably 
linked to economic, political and social factors: the financial crisis, growing nationalism and the stress of 
immigration. The hypothesis, that Marine Le Pen has succeeded in bringing the Front National into mainstream 
politics thanks to her combination of populist social and political platforms, contrasted with a more leftist 
position with regards to the economy, has been proven. This project has determined that Marine Le Pen has 
thus far been successful in her mission to bring the Front National into the mainstream of French politics, and 
her efforts to capitalize on the economic, political and social situation have brought legitimacy to her party. 
Previously seen as being on the outside of the political realm in France, Front National is now a viable and 
promising party competing for the presidency in 2017, a fact that Marine Le Pen is responsible for due to her 
mission to validate her party’s platforms in the public eye. Marine Le Pen’s rise to public prominence has 
disrupted the discourse of French politics in an unprecedented manner. By vocalizing her position against the 
Eurozone and immigration, while representing a very nationalist, pro-France public image, Le Pen appeals to 
traditional conservative values. Le Pen also remains anti-austerity and supports economic protectionism, values 
which help her appeal to more left-minded voters. This unique position has greatly contributed to the success 
of Le Pen’s mission to bring the Front National into the mainstream of French politics.  
As stated in the political section of this paper, the research done during my recent visit to Brussels 
confirmed the influence of the poor economic situation on the surge of the populist parties in Europe. Leaders 
in Europe are treating this as an extraordinary threat to the way policy is made and commissioning various think 
tanks, such as the European Policy Centre, to research ideas on how to combat the rise of the far right because 
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of its destructive effects on lawmaking and governing.  
Further research is needed to determine the lasting consequences of these parties gaining in 
popularity, and of course to determine the future of the Eurozone’s composition. As all of these situations are 
fluid, the research needs to be updated every few weeks. A larger scale project would be able to trace the 
trajectory of each of the Eurosceptic parties in isolation to identify which of these parties will succeed in the 
long run.  
In conclusion, it has been determined that the most problematic thing about the rise of the far right is 
how it affects the discourse of the mainstream political parties by creating a political insurgency, causing 
moderate conservatives to shift the narrative further to the right to appease populist voters. Regardless of if the 
representatives of the far right populist parties are elected, they still create a dramatic disruption in the 
European political process by having an indirect effect of negotiations at the supranational, E.U. level of policy 
making.    
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